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A B S T R A C T
This article presents a market-based idea to compensate for earthquake damage caused by the extraction of
natural gas and applies it to the case of Groningen in the Netherlands. Earthquake certiﬁcates give homeowners a
right to yearly compensation for both property damage and degradation of living space. The level of compen-
sation is a percentage of the joint annual gas revenues of the Dutch government, Shell and ExxonMobil and may
vary based on the intensity of earthquakes in the previous year. These certiﬁcates are tradable within the
Netherlands to stimulate the illiquid housing market in the province of Groningen. Although frequent earth-
quakes have decreased property values in this province, a seller will still receive an eﬃcient price for his house
because he can also sell his earthquake certiﬁcate. A buyer of this certiﬁcate receives an annual stream of income
and may use these revenues, for instance, to repay his mortgage or to maintain his house at reduced tax levels.
However, multiple implementation problems make the viability of this market-based instrument diﬃcult if not
questionable, such as the political decision on the aforementioned level of revenue sharing and the behavioral
complexity of the options that tradable earthquake certiﬁcates oﬀer to homeowners.
1. Introduction
In 1959 the biggest onshore gas ﬁeld in the world was discovered in
the province of Groningen in the Netherlands. Since 1991 this province
suﬀers from earthquakes caused by the extraction of natural gas by the
Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), a joint venture of Shell and
ExxonMobil. More than one thousand earthquakes have been registered
in this region since the nineties, thus far with a maximum magnitude of
3.6 on the Richter scale reached in 2012 but with a relatively strong
impact due to the shallow geological location of the ﬁeld (Van Thienen-
Visser and Breunese, 2015). While the city of Groningen has not been
much aﬀected, there has been a signiﬁcant impact on the many small
villages that surround this city. The earthquakes not only cause damage
to homes but also lead to reduced enjoyment of the environment and
create a conﬂict of interests between the inhabitants of Groningen,
NAM and the rest of the Netherlands. NAM and the remainder of the
inhabitants of the Netherlands beneﬁt from gas extraction, while the
inhabitants of the province of Groningen bear the burden of the da-
mage, in the form of cracks in the walls of their houses, perceived
unsafety due to the risk that buildings may collapse and a faltering
regional housing market (Van der Voort and Vanclay, 2015).
Earthquakes caused by natural gas extraction can be seen as ex-
ternalities: damage to third parties without or with incomplete com-
pensation (e.g. Koster and Van Ommeren, 2015; Couwenberg, O, 2015).
According to economic theory (e.g. Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960), ex-
ternalities should be fully internalized by those who cause them, which
in this case would be NAM. However, on October 5, 2016, the Gro-
ningen District Court ruled that NAM shares this liability with state-
owned company Energiebeheer Nederland (EBN), which implies that the
Dutch government is also indirectly responsible for the earthquake
damage. If complete internalization does not occur, the welfare of
people in Groningen decreases as a result of a commercial activity with
harmful side eﬀects. This decrease in welfare should be prevented or
repaired. The question is how.
This article adds to the sparse legal and economic literature on gas-
induced seismicity (e.g. Ehrman, 2017; Holz et al., 2017) by con-
structing a market-based policy innovation. It ﬁrst explains that the
current set of policy instruments does not fully cover the earthquake
damage and that it also entails signiﬁcant transaction costs: after each
earthquake the inhabitants of Groningen have to ask loss adjusters to
prepare a damage report before they receive compensation (Section 2).
Building upon and expanding Dulleman and Woerdman (2017), the
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article then considers a market-based alternative: tradable earthquake
certiﬁcates (Section 3).2 These certiﬁcates give homeowners in the
earthquake area of Groningen a (yearly) entitlement to a share of the
joint annual gas revenues of the Dutch government and NAM plus a
variable payment based on the intensity of the earthquakes in the
previous year. This entitlement can also be sold, for example to people
who decide to move to Groningen, which stimulates the housing
market. Because people have diﬀerent attitudes to risk, they will re-
spond diﬀerently to the options that the tradable earthquake certiﬁcates
provide (Section 4). The options that are created do confront the people
of Groningen with new transaction costs, but their beneﬁt consists of a
continuous stream of compensation that makes the contested damage
reports redundant and also makes it possible for people to move to a
diﬀerent house, even outside the earthquake area. This article continues
by discussing some of the many implementation problems of this
market-based instrument, which would render its adoption diﬃcult if
not questionable (Section 5). Finally, a conclusion is presented (Section
6).
2. Current earthquake policy
The (Napoleonic) Mining Act of 1810 entered into force in the
Netherlands during the French occupancy and applied until 2003
(Roggenkamp, 2007). This Act could be seen as to give the Dutch State
(hence not the landowner) property rights over any minerals in the
ground as it required mining companies to obtain a production con-
cession from the Crown and entitled the government to a percentage of
those companies’ revenues. In 1963 NAM obtained a perpetual con-
cession to exploit the Groningen gas ﬁeld and under a separate co-
operation agreement the government was entitled to 50% of the gas
revenues (10% directly and 40% via EBN). However, the Dutch gov-
ernment currently receives about 90% of the total annual gas revenues
and NAM the remaining 10% (primarily due to an additional private
contract concluded in the seventies, referred to as Meeropbrengst Re-
geling Groningen) (Van der Hoeven, 2008).
Gas-induced earthquakes occur since the nineties but they have
recently grown in number and magnitude (e.g. Van Thienen-Visser and
Breunese, 2015). NAM has a duty of care under Article 33 of the new
Mining Act of 2003 and is strictly liable for the earthquake damage
based on Article 6:177 of the Dutch Civil Code. Currently the govern-
ment of the Netherlands takes action against the earthquakes caused by
gas extraction by direct regulation limiting NAM's ability to extract gas,
especially around the epicenter of the municipality of Loppersum. Gas
production was capped at 42.5 billion cubic meters in 2014, 27 billion
cubic meters in 2016 and 21.6 billion cubic meters in 2017, with the
government's intention (expressed in 2018) of setting the cap at 12
billion cubic meters ‘as soon as possible’.3 NAM itself ﬁnances the repair
of cracks in the walls of houses: loss adjusters, in the past also paid by
NAM but recently paid by the Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs, have to
determine whether those cracks were caused by (1) earthquakes as a
result of (2) mining activities (double causality). In addition to com-
pensating homeowners for proven damage, NAM also gave 4000 euros
to every household where such property damage had been established.
Those 4000 euros could only be spent on energy saving measures, such
as solar panels and home insulation. This subsidy ended by February 1,
2016, but the Dutch Parliament restored the subsidy on April 3, 2017.
In addition, if a homeowner in the province of Groningen succeeds in
selling his house, NAM compensates for the reduction in price as a re-
sult of the earthquakes. Moreover, the weakest houses in the mining
area of Groningen will be made earthquake-resistant, which is ﬁnanced
by the government. Private engineers commissioned by an independent
executive agency (Centrum Veilig Wonen) apply public safety standards
to determine which houses are relatively weak, while a public body
(Nationaal Coördinator Groningen) prioritizes where and when the in-
spections will take place (NCG, 2017a).
From an economic perspective, current earthquake policy in the
Netherlands is inadequate because homeowners in the province of
Groningen are not fully compensated for mining damage. First, only the
visible damage is restored: there may be hidden damage such as cracks
in beams behind plasterboards or under ﬂoors. Moreover, after every
earthquake that created damage, inhabitants need loss adjusters to
prepare damage reports, which implies signiﬁcant transaction costs.
Second, the one-oﬀ compensation of 4000 euros for energy saving is
only for households in Groningen whose property damage has been
recognized (by NAM or the government) and whose damage is at least
1000 euros; people in the earthquake area of Groningen without cracks
in their walls do not have access to this money. Third, houses have
become less valuable both for homeowners with and without property
damage, albeit to a diﬀerent degree, as a result of the mining activities.
This drop in house prices usually is much greater than the one-size-ﬁts-
all amount of 4000 euros (De Kam, 2016), although diﬀerent calcula-
tion methods lead to diﬀerent (also lower) estimates of this price fall
(Bosker et al., 2016; Koster and Van Ommeren, 2015). NAM does
provide compensation for the lower value of the house, but only for
those homeowners who have been able to sell the house, which may be
diﬃcult and sometimes even impossible.4 Fourth, it is expected that
both the extraction of natural gas and the earthquakes will continue for
years, which will lead to a certain degree of unsafety and reduced en-
joyment of the environment also in the future. It can therefore be ex-
pected that the liquidity of the housing market in the province of
Groningen will remain impaired for many years to come, although re-
cently this housing market has shown slight improvement thanks to a
recovering economy (Boumeester and Lamain, 2017). Finally, the
weakest houses in Groningen will be made earthquake-resistant,
starting in the municipality of Loppersum, but progress has been very
slow.5
Homeowners have had some success obtaining additional compen-
sation through litigation. On September 2, 2015, the Groningen District
Court (Rechtbank Noord-Nederland) ruled that NAM has to compensate
for property devaluation, even in the absence of a sale prospect, in the
earthquake area. NAM ﬁled an appeal against this verdict but the
company was not successful: on January 23, 2018, a Dutch Court of
Appeal (Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden) upheld the original judge-
ment. On October 5, 2016, the Groningen District Court ruled that both
NAM and Energiebeheer Nederland (EBN), whose shares are fully owned
by the Dutch State, are (strictly) liable for the earthquake damage
caused by mining activities in the country. The court reasoned that EBN
(hence the State) is a 40% owner of the gas wholesale company
2 Our idea of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates was ﬁrst published in Dutch, in the main
trade journal for economists in the Netherlands called Economisch Statistische Berichten
(Dulleman and Woerdman, 2017). The present article in English builds upon and con-
siderably expands and nuances the aforementioned short paper in Dutch.
3 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/gaswinning-in-groningen/inhoud/
minder-gaswinning-groningen.
4 One or two real estate agents assess the value loss due to the earthquakes on a case-
by-case basis, which usually results in compensation by NAM between 1% and 5% of the
sales price (http://www.nam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/voortgang-waarderegeling.html). Based
on some of the literature (e.g. De Kam, 2016), one could doubt whether these percentages
cover the entire value loss of the real estate. As a next step, the government started a pilot
in 2016 - on the basis of 10 million euro paid by NAM- to buy up damaged houses that do
not sell on the housing market from owners who suﬀer from socio-economic problems
(e.g. old and sick homeowners who have obtained a medical indication to be hospitalized
in a nursing home) only in the central part of the earthquake area (https://www.
nationaalcoordinatorgroningen.nl/themas/k/koopinstrument). In 2016 there were 179
applications and by the end of 2017 NAM had bought 36 homes.
5 Engineers calculated that about 90.000 of the 241.300 buildings in the earthquake
area of Groningen need to be made earthquake-resistant, which is equal to 152.000 ad-
dresses (Van Rossum, 2015: 10). Early 2015 NAM said that 15.000 homes will have been
inspected by the end of that year and that 8.000 homes will have been made safer by 2017
(EIF, 2015). In the epicenter of the earthquake area, where about 22.000 buildings can be
found, a total of 4.567 inspections had been carried out by the end of 2017 and only 571
houses had been made earthquake-resistant (NCG, 2017b: 14).
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GasTerra, therefore the entire country of the Netherlands proﬁts from
the sale of gas extracted from the Groningen area. On March 1, 2017,
the same court ruled that NAM (but not the Dutch government) is also
liable if people living in the mining area of Groningen suﬀer immaterial
(psychological or emotional) damage. The court stated that NAM's gas
extraction activity, when it causes earthquakes, violates the inhabitants’
right to an undisturbed enjoyment of living space. NAM has also ﬁled
an appeal against this verdict. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant victory for
residents is the ruling of April 20, 2017, by a Dutch Court of Appeal
(Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden), which requires that the Dutch Public
Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) investigates whether criminal
charges should be pressed against NAM for imposing life-threatening
damage to houses.
The above-mentioned policy measures are important, and the recent
court rulings are encouraging, but they do not fully solve the underlying
problem. The fundamental problem is (i) that not all costs of the
earthquakes caused by mining activities are internalized to NAM and
the government, (ii) that the process of damage report preparation by
loss adjusters leads to signiﬁcant transaction costs, and (iii) that the
revenues from gas sales are not a direct source of income to the re-
sidents of the earthquake area, which together contribute to a depressed
regional housing market. The core of the solution is therefore that both
gas extraction and the costs of the earthquakes should lead to shared
interests between NAM and the inhabitants of Groningen. An instru-
ment, or a mix of instruments, is needed that (a) more fully internalizes
the earthquake damage by gas extraction, (b) implies less transaction
costs for homeowners and better reﬂects the varying degrees and types
of damage they experience and (c) helps to further stimulate the
housing market in the province of Groningen. How could this be
achieved?
3. A market for earthquake certiﬁcates
The general idea of allocating property rights that can be traded on
a market to internalize externalities can be found in seminal articles
written by some of the founding fathers of law and economics, such as
Coase (1960) and Calabresi and Melamed (1972). Building upon this
general idea we develop the concept of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates.
These certiﬁcates can be seen as a kind of Pigouvian tax on earthquakes,
giving the certiﬁcate owners a share of the gas revenues obtained by the
government and NAM, while the possible trade in those certiﬁcates can
be viewed as a form of Coasean bargaining between people in the
Netherlands to improve individual welfare positions given their dif-
ferences in damage and risk perception, as will be explained in more
detail below. A system of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates is thus a
market-oriented way to align the above-mentioned conﬂicting interests
and to compensate homeowners for earthquake damage. There are
multiple design options for such a market. One such design, as devel-
oped below, intends to provide a more eﬃcient internalization of the
earthquake damage in Groningen and to create a more equitable link
between the interests of gas consumers throughout the Netherlands and
the interests of the aﬀected residents in Groningen. This policy may be
structured as follows.
NAM could be obliged by the government to issue earthquake cer-
tiﬁcates, one per existing house, as determined by the Land Registry
(Bureau of Records, called Kadaster in the Netherlands). Every house-
hold would then receive an earthquake certiﬁcate based on an alloca-
tion principle that is linked to Land Registry data and to the value and
building construction of the house. To respect diﬀerences in economic
damage due to the gas-induced earthquakes, more expensive (usually
bigger) houses could receive a higher compensation than cheaper (ty-
pically smaller) ones, to be evaluated on the basis of real-property
value. Moreover, to respect diﬀerences in safety, weaker (mostly older)
houses could receive a higher compensation than stronger (newer)
ones, to be evaluated on the basis of building construction. While new
houses tend to be better resistant to the earthquakes than old ones, the
problem is that more than a quarter of the houses in the province of
Groningen was built before World War II, when the Groningen gas ﬁeld
was not even discovered and the gas-induced earthquake damage could
not yet be foreseen.6
The earthquake certiﬁcate could give its owner an indemnity based
on the following two principles.
(1) First, the certiﬁcate will annually provide an income to the owner
associated with the (gross) joint annual gas revenues of the Dutch
government and NAM to compensate for the degradation of living
space. Social welfare is increased by transferring part of the gas
producer surplus to consumers in Groningen who experience stress
and unsafety due to gas-induced earthquakes. In total, the govern-
ment and NAM must from now on pay the certiﬁcate holders, for
example, 30% of their joint annual gas revenues.7 This percentage
could also be higher or lower as we do not know the optimal per-
centage.8 Because the Dutch State proﬁts from the sale of gas (as a
co-shareholder of GasTerra), the proceeds from the certiﬁcate may
be tax-exempt if used to maintain the house to incentivize home
improvement in the earthquake area or if used to repay the mort-
gage to reduce the ﬁnancial risk of residual debt for homeowners in
the earthquake area. This certiﬁcate is also made tradable: it can be
separated from the house to stimulate a liquid certiﬁcates market
with eﬃcient price formation. A market will thus develop for these
certiﬁcates, as will be further illustrated in the following section,
which will give them a (varying) market value. That market value is
anticipated to be based on the sum of all expected (and discounted)
future beneﬁts of the certiﬁcate.
(2) Second, the certiﬁcate will annually provide an income to the
owner which is related to the frequency and intensity of the
earthquakes (on the Richter scale) so as to compensate for property
damage. Residents around the observed epicenters could get a
higher beneﬁt than people who live further away from them. After
the certiﬁcates begin to be traded on a market, the certiﬁcates will
spread over the country. Together with the government, NAM will
set up a fund (for instance based on past gas revenues) to pay the
income to certiﬁcate holders. Annual withdrawals from this fund
are dynamic: they go up or down depending on the earthquakes in
that year and deposits into the fund must be determined in such a
way that over the longer term the fund is suﬃcient to cover the risk
of future earthquake damages.9 Sample data on actual earthquake
damage to houses can help establish the amounts needed to be
deposited into the fund. Unlike current policy, in such a scheme of
tradable earthquake certiﬁcates there is no direct relationship be-
tween damage and compensation, but only an indirect relationship
which also makes causality checks redundant. The advantage of this
is that residents do not have to struggle with loss adjusters and
damage reports before they receive compensation, as they will re-
ceive it anyway through the vehicle of the earthquake certiﬁcate,
which saves on transaction costs. The disadvantage is that if two
families live next to each other in a comparable house, and one
family has more damage than the other, they will still receive the
same certiﬁcate and therefore the same amount of compensation.
Besides the above payment obligations, NAM could be obliged to
6 https://opendata.cbs.nl/#/CBS/nl/.
7 Total gas revenues have gone down, due to the production caps and lower gas prices,
from roughly around 10 billion euros per year to about 4 billion euros per annum (e.g.
4062 million euros in 2016) (Marcelis and De Wilde, 2017: 5).
8 According to Koster and Van Ommeren : 133) (2015), the annual (‘non-monetary’)
costs resulting from a reduction in living comfort are ‘in the same order of magnitude’ as
the monetary costs of property damage due to the gas-induced earthquakes.
9 These dynamic withdrawals could be seen as an example of ‘adaptive governance’
(Janssen and Van der Voort, 2016). Because the yearly withdrawals will be dynamic since
they are based on actual earthquakes, the price of these certiﬁcates will be positive, unless
the earthquakes completely stop.
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buy the house as well as the earthquake certiﬁcate from a resident who
wants to leave the earthquake area. NAM would then also be entitled to
sell this house as well as the certiﬁcate to someone who is willing to
bear the risk. This might be attractive to someone who is looking for a
characteristic house in a quiet area (of which there are many in
Groningen). In this way, the earthquake costs are better internalized by
NAM and the government, and the gas revenues are a direct source of
income for the residents of the earthquake area. As an alternative, not
only NAM but also the government could be involved in this purchase
obligation, given their shared liability. The tradable certiﬁcates system
could thus be seen as a market-oriented Public-Private Partnership
(PPP), which is also common in insurance programs for natural (instead
of induced) earthquakes (Noy et al., 2017).
Earthquake damage is compensated by means of earthquake certi-
ﬁcates from the moment that this new system would be implemented,
which basically ends the ability for homeowners to sue for compensa-
tion. Although the awarded remuneration depends on future variables,
there is an important link with the past. The initial starting balance for
the fund that would be created by the government and NAM could be
based on historic gas revenues and historic records of earthquake da-
mage that resulted from its extraction.
In theory, there could be a time limit to the certiﬁcate system
considered above, depending on the expected time frame for future gas-
induced earthquakes in Groningen. Statistics Netherlands, for instance,
expects that Groningen gas can be produced until at least 2029, but
because the government is likely to respond to the earthquakes by
further lowering the production cap, NAM expects to deliver gas for
many years longer (e.g. CBS, 2015: 16–17). Geologists know that
earthquakes may continue for some more years even after gas pro-
duction has ceased (e.g. Van Thienen-Visser and Breunese, 2015), so
that the duration of the certiﬁcate system should be at least until about
2035 and can be extended with more years as geological insights and
regulatory interventions progress. In practice, the time limit should not
be set too early or may not even be necessary at all since the market
value of the tradable certiﬁcates will be zero if the earthquakes stop.
4. Diﬀerences in damage and risk attitude
To illustrate the operation of a system of tradable earthquake cer-
tiﬁcates, this article now turns to examples with hypothetical residents
A, B, C and D. These people diﬀer in the degree of harm suﬀered as a
result of the earthquakes and in their degree of risk preference.
4.1. Inhabitant A: satisﬁed resident of Groningen, not afraid of earthquake
damage
Inhabitant A receives a certiﬁcate and is a satisﬁed resident of
Groningen. Each year he acquires a limited income from the certiﬁcate,
based on the joint annual gas revenues of the government and NAM and
on the number and intensity of earthquakes. In years with few mild
earthquakes, he only receives the payment based on the above-men-
tioned 30%. In years with more frequent and more severe earthquakes
an additional payment is made from the aforementioned fund. The total
compensation gives him suﬃcient resources to bear the earthquake
costs. Because of the direct connection between the gas revenues of
both NAM and the government and the income of inhabitant A, both he
and NAM beneﬁt from a long-term optimization of gas extraction (cf.
Fischel, 1995). Inhabitant A may sell his certiﬁcate only once, either to
NAM or to another inhabitant of the Netherlands (for instance in-
habitant D, see below). After selling the certiﬁcate, he has no further
right to compensation, but he has received the proceeds from the sale of
the certiﬁcate, which may be used to cope with any damage that may
follow (or for any other purpose).
4.2. Inhabitant B: unsatisﬁed resident of Groningen, afraid of earthquake
damage
Inhabitant B of Groningen is not satisﬁed with his living conditions.
To him, the expected damage and the possible insecurity caused by the
earthquakes outweigh the annual payments from the certiﬁcate.
Despite the relatively low house price due to the earthquakes, this re-
sident has the ability to move and to ﬁnd a better, safer location. He
sells his house, along with the earthquake certiﬁcate, to NAM (or to
another occupant). Inhabitant B not only receives the proceeds from the
sale of his home, but also the market value of the certiﬁcate (the total of
which is likely to be equivalent to the market value of the home absent
earthquake risk). With these two payments he should be able to ﬁnd a
replacement home outside the earthquake area that gives him more
enjoyment than his current home.
4.3. Inhabitant C: resident outside Groningen, not afraid of earthquake
damage
Inhabitant C resides outside Groningen and sees opportunities ra-
ther than threats. He is not afraid of the earthquakes and is a han-
dyman. C can purchase B's home in Groningen, either from NAM or
directly from B. There are now two possible alternatives. C can pur-
chase both the home and the earthquake certiﬁcate, or C can purchase
only the home. If C buys both the home and the earthquake certiﬁcate,
the house is a bargain but C also has to pay for the certiﬁcate; together
this yields an eﬃcient price. Inhabitant C then receives an annual
compensation by NAM and uses this revenue to maintain his home (by
himself or via a contractor), possibly at a lower cost than the beneﬁt of
the certiﬁcate. If NAM had previously purchased the home from B,
NAM could sell it without the certiﬁcate. NAM would then receive less
money but it could withdraw the certiﬁcate from the market, which is a
legitimate ﬁnancial decision by NAM in order to reduce future ex-
penses.
4.4. Inhabitant D: resident outside Groningen, no desire for earthquake
damage
Finally, there is dweller D who lives outside Groningen and wants to
keep it that way. Because the gas and its revenues are used throughout
the Netherlands, the earthquakes from gas extraction in Groningen are
a national problem. Therefore, under the policy considered, D is al-
lowed to buy an earthquake certiﬁcate with his savings, such as the one
oﬀered by inhabitant B. Inhabitant D who owns a home outside
Groningen now also beneﬁts from the tax-friendly facilities for main-
tenance or mortgage repayment combined with an annual payment
based on the gas revenues of both government and NAM and the in-
tensity of the earthquakes. Building contractors in the rest of the
Netherlands do not have to look enviously at their colleagues in
Groningen, because home maintenance can be performed at reduced
tax levels as a result of the gradual spread of certiﬁcates throughout the
country. If D would not own a home, there would be less incentive for
him to purchase the certiﬁcate because the tax-friendly arrangements
are related to homeownership, but he might still be interested in buying
such a certiﬁcate if the expected proceeds from the annual payment are
high enough.
Unfortunately, the housing market in Groningen is depressed
(Boelhouwer et al., 2016), although recently it is slightly improving
(Boumeester and Lamain, 2017). The continuing earthquakes weaken
demand for houses in the province of Groningen, next to uncertainty
about damage compensation and regional population decline, but the
development of compensation arrangements and a recovering economy
have helped to raise conﬁdence in the regional housing market a bit.
The deployment of earthquake certiﬁcates implies that houses (hence
including these certiﬁcates) could be more eﬃciently valued. Under a
scheme of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates, it may be expected that
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more people will relocate: in the example above, inhabitants B and C
have moved and both are happy with their new home. The certiﬁcates
improve the internalization of the earthquake costs and eventually
people can live where it suits their risk attitude towards the earth-
quakes.
A simple alternative for tradable earthquake certiﬁcates would be to
give people living in the province of Groningen (tradable) shares in the
company NAM. Another straightforward option would be to give each
household in this province a sum of ‘danger money’, for instance 1000
euro per year, taken from the gas revenues, as proposed by Hagoort
(2016). The most important disadvantages of shares in NAM or ﬁxed
payments are that those options have no direct link with the earthquake
damage and do not improve the housing market in Groningen. Earth-
quake certiﬁcates, however, are linked to the damage in the earthquake
area and because they are tradable on a national scale, people can freely
move from or to the mining region of Groningen.
5. Implementation problems
It is possible to conceptualize a market for tradable earthquake
certiﬁcates, as demonstrated above, but it will be argued below that
practical implementation is diﬃcult if not questionable.
To make a system of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates work, there
should be a transparent certiﬁcates market that leads to an eﬃcient
market price. In addition, the issue and procurement of certiﬁcates
must run eﬃciently. As a for-proﬁt gas company, NAM would not be
appropriate to execute these tasks. A kind of ‘NAMTerra’ could there-
fore be established (comparable to the aforementioned Dutch wholesale
gas trader GasTerra), which manages the trade in these certiﬁcates.
Both the Dutch central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) and the
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële
Markten) could play a pro-active role in designing these certiﬁcates as a
new ﬁnancial instrument. A somewhat gradual introduction might be
required to ensure that ‘NAMTerra’ does not have to buy too many
houses at the same time and that the pricing of the certiﬁcates takes
shape steadily without excessive transaction volumes.
Tradable earthquake certiﬁcates include a variety of distributional
considerations, so as with any policy instrument, several political de-
cisions need to be made to achieve eﬀective implementation. As part of
this process, various details must be ﬁlled in and interactions must be
anticipated with existing or proposed laws and regulations.
For example, what is the appropriate percentage of the Dutch gov-
ernment and NAM's joint annual gas revenues to be paid to the certi-
ﬁcate holders? We believe that something around 30% is reasonable for
three reasons. First, economists have calculated that 3% of the gas
revenues is currently spent on earthquake damage compensation,
which is expected to rise under current policy to between 8% and 27%
after 2024, depending on whether the earthquake damage will be
moderate or extensive (Marcelis and De Wilde, 2017). Second, max-
imum (hence full) reimbursement of the earthquake damage is needed
to cover external costs, because the inhabitants themselves had no
opportunities in the past to mitigate the damage (Couwenberg, 2015).
Third, a percentage lower than 50% has the advantage that more than
half of the revenues still goes to the government and NAM, so that they
retain a relatively strong incentive to continue the extraction of natural
gas.
A temporary albeit limited continuation of gas extraction makes
sense, not only because of the sunk costs of the gas infrastructure, but
also because of two other externalities: security of supply and, to some
extent, also climate change. A stable economy must minimize depen-
dence on gas imports from politically unpredictable countries outside
the European Union (EU), such as the Russian Federation. Moreover,
gas combustion produces about half of the amount of CO2 per unit of
energy generated compared with the burning of coal. Gas can therefore
be seen as a transitional fuel towards a more sustainable energy system,
in which natural gas soon needs to be phased out in favor of low-carbon
or no-carbon technologies, such as solar power, wind energy and geo-
thermal energy.
Another distributional issue is how the Dutch government and NAM
should divide their share of the aforementioned (for instance) 30%. As
explained earlier, the government currently receives about 90% of the
total annual gas revenues and NAM the remaining 10% (based on a
private contract referred to as Meeropbrengst Regeling Groningen) (Van
der Hoeven, 2008). Taking this division as a starting point, the Dutch
government would then pay 27% and NAM 3% of the total gas revenues
to the earthquake certiﬁcate holders. In the (unlikely) event that NAM
goes bankrupt it seems reasonable that the government would take over
NAM's remuneration requirement because the government already re-
ceives 90% of the gas revenues.
An example of necessary details of the instrument is the determi-
nation of the value and safety of a house to determine the drawing right
from the earthquake certiﬁcate. First of all, which value should be
chosen? Choosing the ‘correct price’ for a house is a serious challenge
since many factors determine house prices. A relatively low-cost option
to solve this problem would be to choose the ﬁscal value of the house
(calledWOZ-waarde in the Netherlands), which is determined each year
by the local authorities. A baseline value could be established by
looking at ﬁscal value records prior to 2012 when the ﬁrst big earth-
quake occurred (near the small village of Huizinge). The reason for
choosing this date is that the depreciation of property due to the
earthquake damage is already discounted in the current (lower) value
of the house.10 A probably more costly alternative to determine the
price of a house would be to require one (or two) real estate agent(s) to
assess its value (and take the average of their monetary valuations).
Secondly, how to judge the safety of a house? This requires an assess-
ment of its building construction for which date of construction could
be used as an indicator since new houses in the province of Groningen
(for instance those built after 2000) are better able to withstand the
earthquakes than old ones (for instance those built before World War
II). To save administrative costs, houses would not have to be inspected
but they can be classiﬁed into safety categories based on date of con-
struction (say, from A to G, comparable to the energy label for products
in the EU).
Owners of buildings in the province of Groningen would receive
tradable earthquake certiﬁcates, but should renters of buildings receive
them as well? From the perspective of property damage compensation
that might not be necessary if the owner who receives a yearly stream of
income from the certiﬁcate uses that money to repair the building's
earthquake damage. Moreover, renters and owners have diﬀerent risks:
a renter can easily end the tenancy and leave, whereas homeowners in
this mining region may have diﬃculties selling the house. However, an
earthquake certiﬁcate not only provides money to repair property da-
mage but also to compensate for deterioration of living space. The
problem is that renters suﬀer from a degraded living environment, not
(just) the owner. Should the owner then (be legally obliged to) pass on
this part of the income from the certiﬁcate to his renters?
An additional decision problem is whether to assign tradable
earthquake certiﬁcates only to citizens who own private homes or also
to commercial enterprises with oﬃces and warehouses in the province
of Groningen. The inclusion of company buildings could lead to a more
complete internalization of the mining damage and to a thicker market
for earthquake certiﬁcates. However, should a company receive one
certiﬁcate per building, irrespective of its size, or should the number of
certiﬁcates be diﬀerentiated based on size so that larger buildings ob-
tain more certiﬁcates? One could perhaps argue that companies should
be excluded from the tradable certiﬁcates system all together, because
the market for oﬃces and warehouses is more heterogeneous than the
market for private homes, or that they should only be excluded from
10 The baseline value could be adjusted for inﬂation because of the economic downturn
at the time.
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that part of the certiﬁcate's income which provides compensation for
reduced living comfort.
Another implementation issue is the gradual introduction of trad-
able earthquake certiﬁcates. The advantage of a gradual introduction is
that ‘NAMTerra’ does not run the risk of having to buy too many houses
at the same time (provided that such a situation would occur in the ﬁrst
place), but the disadvantage would be a thinner market for earthquake
certiﬁcates. An option would be to start at the municipality of
Loppersum, the epicenter of the heaviest earthquakes so far, from
where the certiﬁcate system could be further expanded across the
province of Groningen.
The instrument of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates also entails var-
ious uncertainties. One of the questions is whether there will be suﬃ-
cient demand for the certiﬁcates. This again raises the important issue
of market liquidity, which cannot be taken for granted, but liquidity is
at least stimulated by the option to disconnect the certiﬁcate from the
house and trade it throughout the Netherlands. Moreover, from a be-
havioral point of view, some inhabitants of Groningen will be confused
about the various options that the certiﬁcates oﬀer them. For these
inhabitants, the freedom of choice would then degenerate into choice
overload and stress (e.g. Scheibehenne et al., 2010). In addition, in a
diﬀerent context, it has been argued that the government's expectations
of the ﬁnancial literacy of its citizens are too high (Tiemeijer, 2016).
These could even be valid reasons not to make the earthquake certiﬁ-
cates tradable at all, as earthquake policies need to be ‘transparent and
simple’ (Boelhouwer et al., 2016: 6.), but without tradability the im-
portant advantage of a more active housing market is also lost. Another
issue of uncertainty concerns the magnitude and predictability of the
future payments from the earthquake certiﬁcate, which depends on the
gas revenues of the government and NAM and on the intensity of the
earthquakes. That uncertainty could be limited, however, for instance if
inhabitants would be able to take out (perhaps even subsidized) in-
surance so that private insurance companies can take over this risk.
Nevertheless, the price of the earthquake certiﬁcate will be inherently
uncertain as many factors would inﬂuence its value. Interest rates al-
ways have an eﬀect on ﬁnancial instruments, hence also on the price of
an earthquake certiﬁcate. NAM may even have some market power, but
this could be temporary as certiﬁcates would be gradually introduced,
while competition and ﬁnancial authorities could monitor and penalize
any abuse of such power. Diﬀerences in discount rates, risk attitudes
and damage assessments will all come back in the supply and demand
for those certiﬁcates which ultimately determine its price.
An important overarching implementation issue is whether tradable
earthquake certiﬁcates should replace or complement current earth-
quake policy. Replacement avoids the risk and cost of ineﬃcient
overlaps from potential double regulation. Moreover, NAM is likely to
lobby against an expansion of compensation instruments and could thus
require that earthquake certiﬁcates be a replacement for other com-
pensation. Unfortunately, however, replacement also introduces new
risks. There is the risk of a thin market, as mentioned above, but there
are also additional institutional questions that need to be answered. For
instance: what if a homeowner in Groningen has sold his certiﬁcate, or
someone from outside the province has bought a house in Groningen
without a certiﬁcate, and the house is damaged due to a new earth-
quake? Will he indeed not receive any additional compensation or
should ﬂanking compensation policies be developed as a back-up? And
would such complementary policies strengthen or undermine the eﬃ-
ciency of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates?
In relation to the latter question and to the various issues raised
above, policymakers could beneﬁt from the experience with other
forms of tradable rights and compensation in energy projects, such as
emissions trading and shares in wind energy, which are discussed in
turn below.
The ﬁrst example is emissions trading: the so-called European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which provides a market for CO2
emission rights in order to curb climate damage. The EU ETS is fairly
liquid, but its operation is complicated due to exceptions, overlapping
regulations and related legislation, including laws that apply to ﬁ-
nancial instruments (Woerdman, 2015). Perhaps the market for trad-
able earthquake certiﬁcates would meet the same fate, especially if it
fails to fully internalize the earthquake damage. A patchwork of reg-
ulations would then arise which could reduce the instrument's eﬃ-
ciency. Moreover, in the EU ETS, the eﬀectiveness of the market was
impaired by the low CO2 price caused by an overallocation of emission
rights. The disappointment about the operation of the market for
tradable emission allowances will not increase conﬁdence in the func-
tioning of a potential system of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the EU ETS operates suﬃciently
smoothly: each day millions of emission rights are traded and the
European Commission still perceives it as the ‘ﬂagship’ of European
climate policy.
The second example is shares in wind energy. In Denmark, local
residents receive shares in wind farms to oﬀset another external eﬀect:
the degradation of living space by the noise and visual pollution of wind
turbines. That policy has been reasonably successful. Wind energy
producers are obliged to oﬀer nearby residents the opportunity to ac-
quire, at cost price, at least 20% ownership of a wind turbine. In this
way, local residents not only have the burden but also a share in the
proceeds of the local production of wind energy. Although a resident
may also receive direct compensation for the lower value of his house,
this additional instrument of (tradable) shares has proven to be fairly
eﬀective in uniting the interests of the wind energy producers and the
residents, in compensating some of the non-monetary damage and in
increasing social acceptance of wind energy production (Bengtsson,
2011). Yet there are Danish residents who decline the share option, for
among other reasons because of the complexity and the uncertainty that
these shares represent.
In summary, tradable earthquake certiﬁcates could be a means to
conﬁgure the shared liability for earthquake damage by NAM and state-
owned company EBN in a market-oriented way and to reﬂect the re-
cognition of liability found by the previously mentioned Groningen
District Court rulings from 2015, 2016 and 2017. The core of a system
of tradable earthquake certiﬁcates is attractive: providing a yearly in-
come to homeowners in the earthquake area and avoiding the burden of
damage reports after each and every minor or moderate earthquake.
Additional policies may be necessary, however, to deal with the re-
sidual risk of rare but major earthquakes, for example by further lim-
iting gas production on the Groningen ﬁeld. Moreover, the transaction
costs of reducing and compensating earthquake damage under the
current regime of direct regulation and liability may still be less than
the transaction costs necessary to create such a certiﬁcates market, to
administer its rules and to understand its functioning. Each institutional
arrangement thus has its drawbacks, as argued above, and legal cases
will always emerge, even in a system of earthquake certiﬁcates. For
example, a homeowner who believes that his house has been wrongly
classiﬁed in a relatively safe building construction category as a result
of which he misses out on some certiﬁcate revenues could seek recourse
in the courts. Future research should thus shed more light on the
tradable earthquake paradigm, including the preferences and opinions
of property owners and gas producers in Groningen which are crucial to
the public acceptance of any monetary compensation scheme (e.g.
Terwel et al., 2014). However, if implemented, tradable earthquake
certiﬁcates could act as a precedent for mining regions in other coun-
tries (especially where there is no earthquake policy yet), and could
perhaps even lead to similar systems for other types of externalities.
6. Conclusion
This article neither pleads in favor nor against tradable earthquake
certiﬁcates but merely presents one design of such a system and ana-
lyzes some of its potential consequences. A market for earthquake
certiﬁcates is a possible instrument to internalize the earthquake
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damage from natural gas extraction, in this case by NAM (a joint ven-
ture of Shell and ExxonMobil) in the province of Groningen in the
Netherlands. These certiﬁcates would not give a one-oﬀ payment but
rather an ongoing entitlement to compensation by the Dutch govern-
ment and NAM for both property damage and degradation of living
space caused by the mining-related earthquakes. The tradability of
these certiﬁcates could stimulate people to move and should help
homes in Groningen to obtain a more eﬃcient economic value. In time,
people could live where it suits their risk attitude towards the earth-
quakes. The political feasibility of this instrument cannot be taken for
granted and depends inter alia on the myriad implementation decisions
that need to be taken, for example about the level of compensation to be
paid by the government and NAM.
The advantage of this innovative system would be that compensa-
tion is carried out without the necessity and transaction costs of re-
peatedly having to determine the precise level of damage in advance.
Inhabitants are ‘unburdened’ because they do not have to struggle with
loss adjusters and damage reports anymore. The system could inter-
nalize the earthquake damage more completely via a yearly stream of
income and oﬀers freedom of choice to residents by being able to sell
both the house and the certiﬁcate.
The downside would be that this system introduces the transaction
costs of market creation and choice complexity by ‘burdening’ the in-
habitants with the options that the tradable earthquake certiﬁcates
oﬀer. There is also uncertainty about the expected robustness of the
certiﬁcates market. Moreover, some of the damage could remain un-
compensated due to the indirect relationship between damage and
compensation. In that case the instrument would not fully internalize
the earthquake externality, so that additional tools are needed to cover
the entire damage. Possibly a mix of instruments would then emerge
that not only limits the potential eﬃciency gains of a tradable certiﬁ-
cate system but could also be perceived as more complex by the in-
habitants of Groningen than current earthquake policies.
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